Abstract-Next generation Internet is highly concerned with the issue of trustworthy. An important foundation of trustworthy is authentication of the source IP address. With existing signatureand-verification based defense mechanisms, there is a lack of hierarchical architecture, which makes the structure of the trust alliance excessively flat and single. Moreover, with the increasing scale of trust alliances, costs of validation grow so quickly that they do not adapt to incremental deployment. Via comparison with traditional solutions, this article proposes a hierarchical, inter-domain authenticated source address validation solution named SafeZone. SafeZone employs two intelligent designs: lightweight tag replacement and a hierarchical partitioning scheme, each of which helps to ensure that SafeZone can construct trustworthy and hierarchical trust alliances without the negative influences and complex operations on de facto networks. Extensive experiments also indicate that SafeZone can effectively obtain the design goals of a hierarchical architecture, along with lightweight, loose coupling and "multi-fence support" as well as supporting incremental deployment.
INTRODUCTION
An innate deficiency of the Internet is its susceptibility to IP spoofing. When source addresses of IP packets forwarded through a router are not validated, it is easy for attackers to spoof a source IP address other than the actual address of the host. As a result, source IP address spoofing has plagued the Internet for many years. Attackers forge source addresses to trigger attack events and redirect blame. A research report by US CERT [1] shows that the rate of Internet security attacks is increasing much faster than the development of the Internet itself. Attacks such as DoS/DDoS, Botnet and SPAM are frequent occurrences on the Internet, paralyzing Internet services and causing millions of dollars of financial loss. The largest observed attack to date reached 49Gbps in 2009, a 104% growth over the past two years [2] . Because tens of gigabits of flooding traffic could easily overwhelm most links, routers, or websites on the Internet, DoS attacks have been ranked as one of the largest anticipated threats. Today, validating the authenticity of source IP addresses is challenging the secure operation and sustainable development of the Internet. With varying levels of success, researchers have proposed many source address validation mechanisms to defend against spoofing, among these, classical examples include [3] and [4] . [3] presents an anti-spoofing method which is effective and also supports incremental deployment.
However, [3] is not DoS resilient in the key-update process and cannot be used for anti-spoofing of smaller granularities. [4] derives from and improves upon [3] . It uses the same tagging and key verifying mechanism as [3] and makes the key-update process automatic; [4] is more effective and secure. But, when applied to larger scales, the flat and single architecture of the trust alliance (TA) leads to increasing overhead on processing and storing of the state machine (SM). This makes [4] difficult to adapt to an incremental deployment scheme. Based on the two previous methods, this paper introduces a new antispoofing solution: a hierarchical, inter-domain authenticated source address validation solution, called SafeZone (Section III).
SafeZone can work more efficiently in de facto networks without any changes to the topological structure and interdomain routing protocol(s) under the precondition of ensuring inter-domain high-speed communications. Moreover, SafeZone is more resilient to changes in the network topology and changes to the route from source to destination when compared to [3, 4] without special operation at the intermediate nodes.
Unlike [3] and [4] , all autonomous systems (AS) that deploy SafeZone are divided into a certain number of multilevel TAs; each level of which can serve as a member (abstracted as a whole system) of a higher level TA from bottom to top, the collection of which forms a hierarchical architecture and allows several multi-level TAs to coexist.
By means of the trust alliance border (TAB), which takes the role of a lightweight tag replacement relay agent, SafeZone makes internal network environments trustworthy and invisible to one another among TAs lying at different levels. This has the effect of eliminating the mutual influence coming from TAs at different levels. Via comparison with [3] and [4] , it is obvious that SafeZone further efficiently reduces the overhead on computing, storing, searching, synchronizing and processing the SM (Section IV-A). Experimental results show that, even in a larger scale hierarchical TA architecture, SafeZone can still guarantee effectiveness and simplicity (Section IV-B). SafeZone also establishes and maintains a "deploy early and benefit rapidly" incentive mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses related work; Section III describes the principle underlying SafeZone in detail; Section IV presents the experimental data and evaluation of those results on the costs of running SafeZone and demonstrations of its efficacy; finally Section V concludes the paper. For many years the research community has been committed to combat IP spoofing. Using encryption authentication is a clever way of defending against spoofing packets. Typical examples include [3] and [4] . In [3] , routers at the edge of the source networks mark keys on outgoing packets; these keys are then verified when they are received at the routers at the edge of the destination. Although [3] is useful in many situations to prevent spoofing, the interaction of key updating could easily become the target of DoS/DDoS attacks. Moreover, the costs of encrypting, consulting, and synchronizing between AS pairs preclude the ASes from maintaining many active key-related communication connections. Whereas the original [3] could not be deployed on a large scale, [4] makes each key valid only in one packet and subsequently produces another, entirely new key for each of the following packets. Key updating is finished automatically by special mechanism rather than interaction. This improves the safety and efficiency making eavesdropping and reuse of the key or the whole packet useless. However, due to all member ASes belonging to one single TA in [4] , the resulting structure is just a single, flat (as opposed to layered) TA. Moreover, considering the two-way orderliness of the SM, in order to ensure the efficiency of the validation mechanism, all member ASes must establish a full-mesh and two-way shared relationship among each of AS pairs corresponding to the SM, which results in all border routers residing on every member AS having to maintain the large number of global SMs. In the extreme case, when the scale of member ASes amounts to N, each border router must maintain as many as 2(N-1) SMs causing the space complexity to reach O(N). The cost of SM search and storage, consultation and synchronization are heavy and difficult for routers to validate correctly and control at an efficient level. With the increase in scale of TA, any change coming from the member AS can influence the whole TA situation. Therefore, these aforementioned problems may be a barrier for incremental deployment. Unfortunately, when the scale of a TA increases to a certain scale, [4] may even be inefficient and unreliable.
III. DESIGN PRINCIPLE OF SAFEZONE
In this section we describe a new inter-domain authenticated source address validation solution, SafeZone. SafeZone advocates an intelligent, light-weighted tag replacement based mechanism without negative influence on real-world networks and can provide a way to build a hierarchical architecture. This architecture presents a novel multi-level TA structure. We first summarize a list of technical terms used throughout this paper in Table I .
A. Basic Rationale
As a light-weighted signature-and-verification solution, SafeZone makes all ASes who deploy SafeZone construct a hierarchical organization and allows several multi-level TAs to coexist. That is, all ASes are first divided into a certain number of "lowest level" TAs, allowing each "lowest level" TA to join other higher level TAs as a member (abstracted as a whole system). Continuing in this fashion, the lower level TAs can continuously combine into several higher level TAs from bottom to top, finally forming a hierarchical architecture (Section III-B). Through the work of the TAB, which takes charge of the lightweight tag replacement as the bridge or relay agent, SafeZone makes the internal network environment selfvisible to one another among different level TAs, eliminating the mutual negative influence of change. SafeZone focuses on structuring the hierarchical TA architecture and ensuring the functionality of source address validation without negative influence and complex operations on de facto networks. -nation models. At first, the ASes with equivalent situations are divided into several lowest level TAs, where a single AS is regarded as the unit member. Then, these lowest level TAs are further aggregated to form several higher level TAs on the basis of certain classification principles, where the single lowest level TA is regarded as the unit member, and so on. In this way, the TAs lying in the same level are continually combined to be contained in a certain (smaller) number of higher level TAs in a bottom-up fashion until they become one ultimate, "highest level" TA. Finally, this presents a hierarchical nested structure as shown in Figure 1 . In the architecture of SafeZone, the main equipments used are border routers which takes part in tag adding, replacing and verifying. Considering their respective functions, there are two general types of border routers: ABR and TABR. The ABR resides on the lowest level TA, which is in charge of firstly adding and then finally verifying the tag, and does not consider tag replacement or the global situation of TA. The ABR just maintains the SM in the scope of the lowest level TA. Note that the ABR's number is equal to the amount of member ASes in the lowest level TA. The TABR allocated on the TAB is the crucial link between TAs lying at different levels. The TABR is responsible for the implementation of tag replacement in the cross-TA communication scenario (Section III-C). Because the process of source address validation involves several multiple level TAs and requires collaboration at every level TA, the TABR inside each level TA needs to maintain the GSM.
C. Data Plane
In the hierarchical architecture of TAs, through level division, data communication is expanded into three categories, each with different communication scenarios. These three communication scenarios of the data platform can be outlined as follows:
1) Single TA Communication: This first scenario denotes member ASes belonging to one of the lowest-level TAs mutually communicate among one another. In addition, packets are delivered in the scope of the local network of the lowest-level TA. In this scenario, referring to SMs covering the lowest-level TA, the ABRs only need to execute the traditional mechanism to effectively achieve source address validation. The process of validating packets obviously involves no tag replacement.
2) Cross-TA Communication:
In this second scenario, the ASes belonging to different TAs mutually communicate among one another without establishing a full-mesh and a two-way shared relationship is formed corresponding to the SM by means of introducing the TAB and the MSM. At first, packets sent from the source AS are marked with a series of tags by the source ABR according to the corresponding MSM, guaranteeing the initial authenticity. When packets are transfered from the source to the first TAB en route, the TABR can implement tag replacement with the relevant MSM and GSM. The tags marked in packets are replaced with new ones corresponding to the higher level TA along the actual route. As long as the packets transit several higher level TAs, the TABRs allocated to these TAs continue to complete the tag replacement in this way from bottom to top. During this process, therefore, the serials of TABRs serve as a connecting bridge, or relay agent, in the communication scenario, ensuring the authenticity of the source address among different level TAs. With packets reaching TAs close to the destination AS, on the other hand, the TABR belonging to each level TA can carry out reverse operations from top to bottom. When packets are forwarded to the TAB of the lowest level TA close to the destination AS, the TABR finally replaces the tags referring to the MSM. During the process of forwarding packets en route, other intermediate nodes do not need to deal with the tagged packets. Finally, when the packets reach the destination AS, the ABR verifies and removes the tags added to the packets by checking the MSM, accomplishing the whole process of source address validation. This process is illustrated in Figure 2. 3) TA-Member AS and Non-TA-Member AS Communication: In this scenario, the communication is between the TA-member AS and the non-TA-member AS who does not deploy SafeZone. In addition, packets are just forwarded along the path without any operations on their tags. This scenario does not involve any source address validation.
D. Control Plane
In the control plane, SafeZone requires that the ABR/TABR makes a concerted effort with RES and ACS to accomplish tasks including consultation, decision and deployment on validation rules. In the hierarchical architecture, each level TA needs to deploy one RES to be responsible for two tasks. The first task is to control in a downward fashion, the joining and the leaving of members, the advertizing of local membership, and the ACSes' address space information to local ACSes allocated in the same level TA. The second task is to exchange in an upward fashion, information about membership and ACSes with other RESes residing on other, higher level TAs. While RES is deployed, each member AS needs to deploy one ACS. The ACS is responsible for three tasks. The first is to register with the local RES and to acquire information about membership as well as other ACSes' address space. The second task of the ACS is to exchange the IP prefix space and to consult the initial SM with other ACSes. The third and most important task is to set up the mapping table between the IP prefix and AS in addition to establishing the two-way SM table on ABR/TABR and then subsequently taking control of them to successfully execute the duties on the data plane. Simultaneously, the ACS also communicates upward with other ACSes allocated to other, higher level TAs to complete similar work. It is important to remember that during the implementation process, every TAB makes known their status of being a relay agent as well as the ACS residing on the TAB can finish the configuration on TABR. The work process of the control plane is shown in Figure 3 . 
E. Security Concerns
For the sake of preventing eavesdropping and the interception of validation information, we specially take account of the robust design as follows:
1) The SM periodically auto-updating scheme: The scheme focuses on introducing activation time and expiration time for each SM. When the SM expires, both the source and destination AS must auto-update the SM simultaneously so that it can guarantee three characteristics, namely: timeliness, uniqueness and reliability. This is fast and easy.
2) The time synchronization scheme: In SafeZone, in order to solve the problem of clock-drift, RES can use the Network Time Protocol (NTP) for synchronizing the clocks of ACSes by regularly delivering time correction packets allowing each ACS to correct the clock of relevant ABR/TABR. In addition to this, ACS triggers a shared time slice during which both the exactly expired tags and the exactly updated tags are treated as valid tags for source address validation. Consequently, we can further ensure synchronization of the SM.
3) The secure channel scheme: Under de facto interdomain networks, we employ a combination of TCP interception and the Diffie-Hellman protocol in order to set up a secure channel for the safe exchange of validation information through the established TCP connection.
4) The working modes of TABR: According with ascertaining the security situation of network in a timely manner, in our designs we allow TABR to switch operating modes flexibly during the process of tag replacement. The operating modes are divided into the mode of direct replacement and the other is the mode of replacement as well as validation.
F. Properties of SafeZone
Compared with the flat, inter-domain source address validation methods proposed in [3, 4] , we are in a position to further define the desirable properties of the SafeZone as follows:
• Hierarchical architecture: By the means of partitioning, SafeZone creates a multi-level coexistence of TAs and constructs a hierarchical architecture as opposed to that of the flat, single structure.
• Internal independence among different level TAs:
Depending on the work of the TAB, which serves as lightweight tag replacement relay agent, SafeZone can make the internal network environments trustworthy and invisible among different level TAs as well as preventing influences between each other. • Low overhead: SafeZone can considerably reduce overhead on computing, storing, searching, synchronizing and processing the SM in a cross-TA communication scenario without establishing a fullmesh and two-way shared relationship corresponding to the SM. Experimental results show that, even in large scale hierarchical TA architectures, SafeZone can still guarantee effectiveness and simplicity. The degree of optimization on the costs of validation is observable (Section IV-B).
IV. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
As we already indicated in Section III, the number of the SMs directly affects the overhead on computing, storing, searching, synchronizing and processing. The number of the SMs is a critical factor to be evaluated. In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of SafeZone in reducing the number of SMs. We then evaluate the optimization of the number of SMs based on an experimental deployment.
A. Efficiency Analysis
Compared with [3] and [4] , we can prove that SafeZone is more effective and more safe in reducing the number of the SMs maintained in ABR/TABR, in both the uniform and nonuniform hierarchical structures constructed by SafeZone. This can further achieve the goal of considerably reducing the overhead in validation. In summary, SafeZone can obtain the design goals of hierarchical architecture, lightweight, loose coupling, and incremental deployment. (Because of space limitation the details will not be dealt with here. For more details please refer to [5] ).
B. Experimental Evaluation
Based on deployment experiments, we evaluate the advent- -age of SafeZone on the optimization of the number of the SMs over [3, 4] . In both of the below experiments, SafeZone is deployed on a network environment where the TA has either a uniform, hierarchical structure or non-uniform, hierarchical structure, respectively. We start our experiments under the precondition that all RESes and ACSes have already completed the process of exchanging validation information and configurations on ABR/TABR. The routing protocol used in both deployment experiments is the Border Gateway Protocol version 4 (BGPv4).
1) Experiment I. To verify the effectiveness in uniform, hierarchical structures built upon SafeZone:
Network Simulator version 2 (NS2) [6] was used to evaluate the performance of SafeZone in Experiment I. For simulation purposes, the maximum number of member ASes is set to a relatively high 40,000 on the simulation environment in accordance with the report in [7] . According to the uniform hierarchical structure, we select respectively 4 groups: {L=4, m=5},{L=5, m=5},{L=5, m=4} and {L=4, m=4} [5] , to evaluate the performance on optimization on ABR and 4 groups: {L=2}, {L=3}, {L=4}, {L=5} [5] to evaluate the performance on optimization on TABR. From the results shown in Figure 4 ), reduced from the O(N) of previous methods. Meanwhile, the results can demonstrate that even on large scales, deployment of SafeZone still performs better than [3, 4] and other relative methods.
2
) Experiment II. To verify the effectiveness in nonuniform, hierarchical structures built upon SafeZone:
Supported by the project of the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (863 Program), Tsinghua University whose aim it was along with other research groups, to address the issue of the weakness on safety and reliability, and to make efforts to solve the difficult problems of authenticated address access. So far, on the basis of the development and implementation of a trustworthy Internet infrastructure, security service and typical application, three IETF standard drafts [8] [9] [10] have been submitted; one document eventually became a RFC, RFC5210 [11] . Currently, the prototype system based on authenticated IPv6 source address validation architecture has been deployed and tested on CNGI-CERNET2. With the development of this project, many research institutes, ISPs and equipment manufacturers have become involved, including domestic members CERNET2 [18], ChinaTelecom and ChinaMobile, overseas members including in TEIN3 [19] , GÉANT2 [20] , APAN-JP [21] and KREONet2 [22] . These members are all designated with more than 225 globally unique AS Nums, which provided an ideal network environment for our Experiments II. Based on traffic data collected from Aladdin NMS in NOC of CNGI-CERNET2, we analyzed and found that the portion of internal traffic within CNGI exceeds by a large margin the portion of traffic accesses to NGI. Also, the portion of internal traffic within CERNET2 exceeds by a large margin the portion of traffic accesses to CNGI. Due to these findings, we constructed the global Next Generation Internet TA (NGITA) shown in Figure 6 . This kind of TA resulted in not only the ability to partition and reduce the number of SMs, but also the ability to avoid the excess costs on tag replacement. Compared to [3, 4] and other relative methods, the average rate of reduction can reach to 85% shown in Table II . Experimental results show that SafeZone is more effective, safe and prove the designed schemes to be feasible. ChinaTelecom  45+  448  88  80%  98  78%  ChinaMobile  55+  448  108  76%  118  74%  TEIN3  20+  448  38  92%  48  89%  GÉANT2  34+  448  66  85%  76  83%  APAN-JP  32+  448  62  86%  72  84%  KREONet2  14+  448  26  94% 36 92% Figure 6 . The hierarchical organization of NGITA V. CONCLUSION Compared with [3, 4] and other relative signature-andverification solutions, SafeZone focuses on ensuring the functionality of source address validation based on de facto networks and has been found in our experiments to especially adept at flexibly constructing the hierarchical architecture of TA. By introducing two intelligent designs: lightweight tag replacement and hierarchical partitioning, SafeZone can make the internal network environments trustworthy and invisible among different level TAs, eliminating the mutual influence coming from these multi-level TAs under the precondition of ensuring inter-domain high-speed communications. Experimental results show that even when implemented on large scale hierarchical architectures, SafeZone can still achieve the effectiveness, simplification, and optimizing of costs on the SM. In future work we will focus on experimental deployment and tests based on CNGI-CERNET2 in preparation of global scale deployment on CNGI. We will conduct further research on designing and improving the performance of SafeZone to make it safer and more light-weight.
